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Perspectives on Terrorism -  
Who Becomes a Terrorist 
Today? 
By Scott Atran 
Introduction: Takfiri Terrorism 
Since the invasion of Iraq, and with the rapid spread of 
Internet access, the world has witnessed a more egalitarian, 
less-educated and -materially well off, and more socially
marginalized wave of would-be jihadi martyrs. Although 
millions of people support violent jihad, very few are 
willing to do it. Those who do pursue violent jihad usually 
emerge in small groups of action-oriented friends. They 
come from the same neighborhood and interact during 
activities, such as soccer or paintball. Often they become 
camping and hiking companions who learn to take care of 
one another under trying conditions, which causes them to 
become even more deeply attached. Increasingly, they may
first meet in a chat room where the anonymity of the World 
Wide Web paradoxically helps to forge intimate emotional 
ties among people who might otherwise physically 
intimidate or put off one another. They learn to live in a 
parallel universe ─ a conceptually closed community of
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comrades bound to a cause ─ which they mistake for the
world. 
These young people self-mobilize to the tune of a simple, 
superficial, yet broadly appealing “takfiri” message of
withdrawal from impure mainstream society and the need 
for violent action to cleanse it. It is a surprisingly flat but 
fluid message pre-adapted to any new event in the world, 
which is readily shared by young people I have interviewed 
from the remote Indonesian Island of Sulawesi, to the 
Spanish enclave of Ceuta (Septa) in North Africa, and in 
places scattered throughout Pakistan, Palestine, and the 
suburbs of Paris. 
Takfiris (from takfir, “excommunication”) are rejectionists 
who disdain other forms of Islam, including wahabism (an 
evangelical creed which preaches Calvinist-like obedience 
to the state) and most fundamentalist, or salafi, creeds 
(which oppose fighting between co-religionists as sowing 
discord, or fitna, in the Muslim community). Salafi Islam is 
the host on which this viral Takfiri movement rides, much 
as Christian fundamentalism is the host upon which White 
Supremacism rides. The host itself is not the cause of the 
virus and is, indeed, a primary victim. As one senior Saudi 
intelligence officer recently told me, “Often the first sign of 
someone becoming a Takfiri is that he stops praying where 
his family and tribe pray. He leaves the mosque and turns 
against his family, tribe and our Salafi way.” 
One telltale sign of radicalization in the move to Takfirism 
is when members of a neighborhood mosque or cultural 
center (or just an informal discussion group that meets at a 
bookstore or at picnics) gel into a militant faction that 
leaves, voluntarily or involuntarily. This is what happened, 
for example, when Ali al-Timimi and his group of paintball 
buddies were ejected from the Dar al-Arqam Cultural 
Center in Falls Church, Virginia, after praising the 9/11 
attack (12 members of the group were later convicted for 
aiding Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani group allied to al-
Qaeda). Another example is when the soccer-playing Salafi 
Imam at the M-30 mosque in Madrid expelled Serhane 
Fakhet and friends (who continued to self-radicalize, 
playing soccer and picnicking together, in the lead up to the 
Madrid train bombings). 
Western politicians, pundits, and publics generally do not 
understand that the strict Salafi schools in Indonesia, Egypt, 
Saudi Arabia, Yemen and elsewhere are the most
vociferous and effective opponents of violent jihad. Most 
present-day Takfiris are “born again” in their late teens and 
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early twenties and have little knowledge of religion beyond 
the fact that they consider themselves “true Muslims” who 
must fight enemies near and far to defend their friends and 
the faith that makes their friendship meaningful and 
enduring.  
Soccer, paintball, camping, hiking, rafting, body building, 
martial arts training and other forms of physically 
stimulating and intimate group action create a bunch of 
buddies (usually not less than 4 and not more than 12, with a 
median of 8), who become a “band of brothers” in a glorious 
cause. It usually suffices that a few (usually at least two) of 
these action buddies come to believe in the cause, truly and
uncompromisingly, for the rest to follow even unto death. 
Humans, like all primates, need to socially organize, lead 
and be led; however, notions of “charismatic leaders” going 
out or sending recruiters to “brainwash” unwitting minds 
into joining well-structured organizations with command
and control is grossly exaggerated. Standard 
counterterrorism notions of “cells” and “recruitment” – and 
to some degree even “leadership” – often reflect more the 
psychology and organization of people analyzing terrorist 
groups than terrorist groups themselves.  
Such “bureaucratic mirroring” is also evident in misguided 
policies grounded in the premise that simply presenting 
people with rational arguments and material incentives will 
lead them down the correct or better path. Most human 
beings are more interested in persuading themselves that 
they are right, whatever the evidence against them, than in 
finding out that they are wrong. They are more interested in
victory than truth. And when was the last time rational 
argument or a buy-off offer convinced anyone you know to 
select the right (boy or girl) friend? 
Problems with Prevailing Theories of Terrorism: 
Outdated Data and Inattention to Detail 
Alan Krueger, in his new book What Makes a Terrorist: 
Economics and the Roots of Terrorism (Princeton University 
Press, 2007), produces data for three general findings: (1) 
poverty and lack of education are uncorrelated, or slightly 
negatively correlated, with being a terrorist or support for
terrorism; (2) most terrorists stem from countries that are not 
poor, but that restrict civil liberties; and (3) terrorism is 
mostly directed against democratic rather than authoritarian 
regimes. He then infers causes from these broad 
correlations: (A) poverty and poor education do not produce 
terrorism, but denial of political freedom does; and (B)
terrorists target democratic regimes because terrorists seek 
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publicity and widespread panic and democracies are more 
responsive to public opinion. These conclusions echo Robert 
Pape’s best-selling book Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic 
of Suicide Terrorism (University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
A major problem with such works is that they assume 
correlations with economic status, education level, or degree 
of civil liberties usefully predict who or how people become
terrorists. This mistaken premise misleads policymakers and 
researchers. It is the social networks and group dynamics of 
these networks that are critical to understanding how 
terrorist networks form and operate, not the demographic 
profiles of individuals and whole populations. 
Consider Islamic terrorism, the main focus of Krueger’s 
book. The significant correlation between the countries of
origin of Islamic terrorists and countries that limit civil 
liberties is true, but uninformative. The same correlation 
holds for indefinitely many Muslim groups that have 
nothing to do with terrorism. 
Only al-Qaeda is interested in attacking the “far enemy,” 
that is, the United States and its allies. Isaac Ben Israel, an 
Israeli parliamentarian who currently heads his country’s 
space agency, was former chief of air force operations and 
top military strategist in a successful campaign to stop 
Hamas suicide bombings. He told me that “al-Qaeda is a 
very different problem and is not ours; our operational 
problems with Hezbollah and Hamas involve regional
networks with regional aims, although we are ready to help 
the United States with its global al-Qaeda problem whenever 
we can.” More than 80 percent of people who have joined or 
expressed allegiance to al-Qaeda have done so outside their 
country of origin. This, of course, is not the case with 
Hezbollah or Hamas. Whether one joins jihad in the 
diaspora or in one’s native country, and not country of 
origin per se, is the key factor in how one is willing to use 
terrorism and against whom. 
The correlation between terrorist acts and target countries, 
indicating that democracies are victims more than 
autocracies, is spurious. It requires accepting that attacks on 
U.S occupation forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are attacks 
upon U.S. democracy. In fact, there have been very few 
attacks carried out directly against western democracies, and 
only three with significant casualties (USA-11 September
2001, Spain-11 March 2004, UK-7 July 2005). There have 
been no major attacks against the democracies of Israel or 
Indonesia in the last two years, and only one major attack in 
India outside the disputed territory of Jammu-Kashmir 
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(11/07/06 in Mumbai). There have been 2400 arrests related 
to Takfiri terrorist activities in Europe, where civil liberties
are guaranteed. 
Only in Iraq and Afghanistan has there been a continuing 
high rate of attacks against US-led coalition forces, which 
are increasingly perceived as occupation forces by large 
segments of the populations of these two countries. It is 
doubtful that reaction would be much different if invasion 
and occupation forces were those of a dictatorship, as with 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The world’s 
newest and most active areas for suicide attacks are 
Pakistan and North Africa, where civil liberties are 
restricted. Over 200 people were killed in North Africa in 
2007, mostly in Algeria. In Pakistan, nearly 500 were killed 
in suicide attacks in the second half of 2007 (including
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto), greater than the 
number of people killed in terrorist attacks in Europe over 
the last two decades. Local groups proclaiming allegiance 
or sympathy with al-Qaeda have claimed responsibility, but 
al-Qaeda does not appear to have direct operational
command or control over any of these groups. 
Consider, now, the relationship between socioeconomic 
status and terrorism. To independently confirm Krueger’s 
findings on Hamas my research group statistically regressed 
Palestinian support for suicide attacks against Israelis on 
education and income levels in three nationally 
representative surveys of Palestinians (West Bank and 
Gaza) from 1999, 2001 and 2005. We controlled for area of 
residence, refugee status, age, gender and religion. Income 
and education levels were unrelated to support for suicide 
attacks. When there was a relationship between support for 
suicide attacks and economic variables we found, like 
Krueger, that income and education levels are modestly, but 
positively correlated with support. In the 1999 survey, 
wealthier Palestinians expressed greater support for attacks, 
while more educated Palestinians showed greater support 
for suicide attacks in the 2001 surveys. 
But when we turn to al-Qaeda’s most important Southeast 
Asian ally Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), we find something 
different. We analyzed every attack by Southeast Asia’s JI 
between 1999 and the second Bali bombing of 2005 (apart 
from the purely local conflicts of Poso and Ambon) and 
entered demographic details on all known operatives. Of 
about 180 people implicated in JI attacks, 78 percent 
worked in unskilled jobs, and only 23 percent had education 
beyond high school.  
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We also found that operational associations in JI are
determined by four variables: (1) being a member of the 
self-styled “Afghan Alumni,” that is, someone who went 
through training with the Indonesia volunteers in the Abu 
Sayyaf’s Sadah training camp during the Soviet-Afghan 
War and its immediate aftermath; (2) continuing to work
together (e.g., on Abdullah Sungkar’s chicken farm in 
Malaysia) or to play soccer together after demobilization 
from Afghanistan (and before JI was officially established); 
(3) having studied or taught in at least one of the two 
religious schools established by JI’s founders (Al-Mukmin 
in Java and Lukman Al-Hakiem in Malaysia); and (4) being 
related by kinship or marriage to someone else in the 
network (e.g., there are more than 30 marriages woven 
through 10 attacks). In contrast with these factors, we find 
that the knowledge of JI’s “official” organizational structure 
is largely uninformative in helping us to understand the 
networks involved in JI attacks. 
Levels of education and skill are significantly higher for 
Hamas than for JI. Nevertheless, the main predictors for 
involvement in suicide attacks are, again, small-world 
aspects of social networks and local group dynamics rather 
than large-scale social, economic, and political indicators, 
such as education level and economic status. For example, 
Hamas' most-sustained suicide bombing campaign in 2003-
2004 involved several buddies from Hebron's Masjad
(mosque) al-Jihad soccer team. Most lived in the Wad Abu 
Katila neighborhood and belonged to the al-Qawasmeh 
hamula (clan); several were classmates in the 
neighborhood's local branch of the Palestinian Polytechnic 
College. Their ages ranged from 18 to 22 years old. At least
eight team members were dispatched to suicide shooting 
and bombing operations by the Hamas military leader in 
Hebron, Abdullah al-Qawasmeh (killed by Israeli forces in 
June 2003 and succeeded by his relatives Basel al-
Qawasmeh, killed in September 2003, and Imad al-
Qawasmeh, captured on October 13, 2004). A closer look at
actual attacks reveals that almost all are rooted in local 
networks of pre-existing social relationships. 
In February 2008, I interviewed members of the families of 
suicide bombers Mohammed Herbawi and Shadi Zghayer, 
shortly after an attack in Dimona, Israel. This was the first
suicide attack claimed by Hamas since December 2004, 
when Hamas declared a unilateral truce on martyrdom 
actions across the Green Line. These two friends were 
members of the same Hamas neighborhood soccer group as
several others who died in 2003: the Masjad al-Jihad team.
Herbawi had been arrested as a 17-year-old on March 15, 
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2003, shortly after a suicide bombing on Haifa bus (by 
Mamoud al-Qawasmeh on March 5, 2003) and coordinated 
suicide shooting attacks on Israeli settlements by others on 
the team (March 7, 2003, Muhsein, Hazem al-Qawasmeh, 
Fadi Fahuri, Sufian Hariz) and before another set of suicide
bombings by team members in Hebron and Jerusalem on 
May 17-18, 2003 (Fuad al-Qawasmeh, Basem Takruri, 
Mujahed al-Ja'abri). Herbawi’s mother, Basma Harmoni 
(she is divorced), said her son loved all those boys.  
The Imam at Masjad al-Jihad, Fellah Naser Ed-Din, is also 
crazy about soccer (he showed me albums of his soccer 
team pictures since his boyhood days) and refereed the 
boys. The Imam told us that the soccer buddies self-
organized matches involving 15 mosque teams in the area, 
naming the matches after martyrs (a painted sign behind the 
goalpost at the Abu al-Dhabat school reads “Championship 
by Martyr Ra’ed Missak,” in honor of the young man from 
Hebron who killed 23 people and wounded more than 130 
on a Jerusalem bus on August 19, 2003). According to the
Imam, Muhsein Qawasmeh was the smartest and best of the 
2003 team and he inspired the others. I received much the 
same message from Fawzi Qawasmeh, father of one of the 
young men, who went on the mission with Muhsein. Hazem 
Qawasmeh, who went on the mission with Muhsein, stated 
that “without Muhsein, I doubt the other would have would 
have acted.” At the house where Muhsein's family now 
lives, I found his mother and brother commiserating with 
Herbawi’s uncle. Muhsein’s mother said her son had been
an exemplary student but left school after the Intifada broke 
out and focused on soccer and religion. 
The Hamas leadership in Damascus later claimed 
responsibility for the Dimona attack (after Fatah’s Al-Aqsa’
Martyrs Brigades had claimed it) but the politburo clearly 
did not order it or even know about it (Usama Hamdan, who 
handles external relations for Hamas in Beirut, initially said 
he didn’t know who was responsible; and when I asked 
senior Hamas leaders in the West Bank if this meant that he
didn’t know about it they said, “You can conclude that; we 
certainly didn’t”). Sources close to Israeli intelligence told 
me at the Knesset that Mahmoud Zahar, the Hamas leader 
in Gaza, and Ahmed Al Ja’abri, the military commander of 
the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, probably wanted to 
launch an operation across the Israel-Egypt border after 
Hamas breached the border wall between Gaza and Egypt 
but couldn’t, so al-Ja’abri called upon his clan ally in 
Hebron, Ayoub Qawasmeh, to do an operation. Ayoub 
Qawasmeh then tapped into the young men on the soccer 
team who had been earnestly waiting to do something for 
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their comrades and their cause. 
The most complete data in Krueger’s book concerns 
Hezbollah and Hamas. There is a secondary focus on al-
Qaeda. For all three cases, the data is old and of
questionable relevance to global terrorism today. Hezbollah 
ceased suicide bombings and attacks on civilians (outside of 
open war) by the 1990s. Hamas has claimed responsibility 
for only one attack since December 2004. al-Qaeda central, 
the command set up by Osama Bin Laden in the summer of
1988 and which was involved in the 9/11 attacks, has had 
no direct success in carrying out a terrorist operation since 
2002 (the Djerba, Tunisia bombings), though it had a hand 
in prior financing of operations carried out later (Istanbul 
bombings 2003) and in training people implicated in
subsequent attacks (about 50 suicide bombers involved in 
attacks in Saudi Arabia through April 2005).  
The original al-Qaeda group around Bin Laden (mostly 
Egyptians) has been decimated by about an order of
magnitude. Al-Qaeda’s surviving remnants are mostly 
concentrated in a handful of small mobile camps in 
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The largest 
remaining al-Qaeda camp in 2007, Mir Ali in North 
Waziristan, has had a few dozen trainees under the tutelage 
of Abu Ubaydah Al-Masri. Al-Masri instructed those 
responsible for the summer 2006 suicide bombing plot to 
smuggle liquid explosives aboard a number of passenger 
jets, and he has likely been involved in a few other 
dangerous but so-far unsuccessful plots. 
For the most part, the “new wave” of terrorism that 
expresses allegiance to al-Qaeda tends to be poorer, less
educated and more marginal than the old al-Qaeda or its 
remnants. It relies to a greater extent for financing and 
personnel on pre-existing petty criminal networks because 
large-scale financing is easily tracked (the attacks on Sept. 
11 cost some $400,000 followed by the 2002 Bali and 2004 
bombings at about $50,000 each, with all others 
considerably less). The Saudi Ministry of Interior conducted 
a study of 639 detainees through 2004 and is presently 
finishing a newer study through 2007. Nearly two-thirds of 
those in the sample say they joined Jihad through friends
and about a quarter through family. A closer look at other 
terrorist groups reveals strikingly similar patterns of self-
radicalization based on almost chance encounters within 
pre-existing local circles of friends and kin. Former CIA 
case officer Marc Sageman analyzed Qaeda networks 
through 2003 and found that about 70 percent join through 
friends and 20 percent through kin. In his new book 
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Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the 21st Century 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007) Sageman finds that 
more recent networks are also built up around friendship and 
kinship but members are more marginal relative to
surrounding society.  
The newer Saudi sample bears this out. Compared with the 
earlier sample, the newer wave tends to be somewhat
younger (and more likely to be single), less educated and 
less financially well off, less ideological, and more prone to 
prior involvement in criminal activities unrelated to Jihad, 
such as drugs, theft, and aggravated assault. They are much 
more likely to read jihadi literature in their daily lives than 
other forms of literature. They tend to look up to role models 
who stress violence in Jihad, like the late Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, than to those who justify and limit violence 
through moral reasoning, such as the late Abdullah Azzam. 
A majority come to religion later in life, especially in their 
early twenties. In the older cohort there was little traditional 
religious education; however, the newer cohort tends to be 
less ideologically sophisticated and especially motivated by 
desire to avenge perceived injustices in Iraq. (When I asked
detainees in Saudi Arabia who had volunteered for Iraq why 
they had, some mentioned stories of women raped, the 
killing of innocents and desecrations of the Koran, but all 
mentioned Abu Ghraib). 
This “new wave” pattern of increasingly marginality and 
“born-again” religion is reflected in European and North 
African groups that express allegiance to al-Qaeda, as well 
as foreign fighters in Iraq (41 percent from Saudi Arabia and 
39 percent from North Africa since August 2006, many of 
whom come in bunches from the same town, for example, 
the 50 or so volunteers from Darnah, Lybia, according to 
West Point’s Sinjar Report on Foreign Fighters in Iraq). 
Krueger and others repeatedly refer to predictive factors in 
“recruitment.” It is important to understand that there is no,
and has never been, clear evidence of “recruitment” into al-
Qaeda. In its heyday, al-Qaeda operated more like a funding 
agency than a military organization. People would come to 
al-Qaeda with proposals for plots. Al-Qaeda would accept 
some 10-20 percent. Even the 9/11 suicide pilots were not 
“recruited” into Al-Qaeda. They were Middle Eastern Arabs 
who lived in a middle-class Germany community (the 
Hamburg suburb of Harburg) and were seeking friendship 
and identity in an Islamic community that was mostly 
Moroccan. Our interviews with friends in their circle and
investigators reveal that the plotters met in the dorms and 
started hanging out together, including going to mosque 
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services and meeting in local restaurants. Three wound up 
living in the same apartment, where they self-radicalized. 
They first thought of going to Chechnya to do jihad (but
getting there proved too difficult) then to Kosovo (but the 
Albanian jihadis didn’t want them), and eventually wound 
up in an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan as a distant 
third choice. 
There is no clear evidence that al-Qaeda ever had a 
recruiting or training infrastructure in Europe, although 
there is increasing evidence that al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-
related groups in Pakistan’s tribal areas maintain
communication with Europeans after the train in Pakistan. 
This seems to be especially the case with those involved in 
recent plots in the United Kingdom. Generally, however, 
people go looking for al-Qaeda, not the other way around. 
Because there is very little of the old al-Qaeda left, many
who go seeking al-Qaeda are caught. Those who seek out 
al-Qaeda do so in small groups of friends, and occasionally 
through kin. Almost all are schoolmates or workmates, and 
camp, soccer, or paintball buddies. Only a minority has 
gone beyond high school. Some have steady jobs and 
family, but many have only intermittent jobs and no 
families of their own. All have self-radicalized to some 
degree as friends before they go after al-Qaeda, although an 
encounter with someone who has been to an al-Qaeda
training in camp in Afghanistan is occasionally an added 
stimulant. The overwhelming majority have not had 
sustained prior religious education but become “born again” 
into radical Islam in their late teens and early 20s. About 10 
percent are Christian converts. 
For example, in the wake of the Iraq invasion in April 2003, 
a disciple of the radical Islamist preacher Sheikh Omar 
Bakri organized a barbecue in a London suburb for about 
100 people, most from the immigrant Pakistani community.
Guests were asked for donations to help send a few 
volunteers to Pakistan to train for Jihad. Among those who 
used some of 3,500 euros collected to pay their way to 
Pakistan were Mohammed Sidique Kahn, one of the four
suicide bombers in the July 2005 London Underground 
attack, and Omar Khyam, one of the conspirators convicted 
in the 2005 “Crevice” plot to plant fertilizer bombs around 
London. Their original intention was to do Jihad in 
Kashmir, but after a quick course in bomb-making they 
were told to “go home” and do something there. Each 
joined up with a few friends to concoct a plot. Interviews by 
journalist Jason Burke with investigators and friends 
familiar with the Crevice case suggest that 10 days of 
arduous hiking, camping, and training in Pakistan cemented 
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commitment between buddies who learned to live together 
and care for one another. White-water rafting seems to have 
played a similar role in bonding the London Underground 
plotters. One of the four London suicide bombers was also a
Jamaican Christian convert and pinball buddy. 
Another telling example is the Madrid train bombing in 
March 2004. Five of the seven plotters who blew 
themselves when cornered by police grew up within a few
blocks of one another in the tumble-down neighborhood of 
Jemaa Mezuak in Tetuan, Morocco: Jamal Ahmidan (“El 
Chino”), brothers Mohammed and Rachid Oulad Akcha, 
Abdennabi Kounjaa (“El Afghan”), and Rifaat Asrin (“El 
Niño). One, nicknamed the “Chinaman,” fled Morocco in 
1993 from a murder charge, joining his elder brother in 
Madrid in taking and dealing drugs. In 1995, with his 
teenage Christian girlfriend and fellow junkie five months
pregnant, the Chinaman decided to kick his heroin habit. 
His wife says he did it cold turkey with the help of the 
religion he was getting in a local mosque. The Chinaman 
turned around to preach reform to his drug-dealing
associates, three brothers from the Mezuak, convincing two 
to quit their habit. The brothers became devoted to the 
Chinaman, and thereafter known in the barrio as his 
“bodyguards.”  
The fourth of Madrid’s Moroccan suicide bombers was 
described to us by some of his friends as Mezuak’s first 
“Afghan” (a religious militant who grows a full beard and 
dresses with an Afghan hat, coarse knee-length tunic and 
sandals). He would preach jihad against “infidels” (kuffar) 
and Muslims who merit “excommunication” (takfir) 
because they refuse to follow “pure” Islamic ways. The 
father and friends of the fifth suicide bomber, a young gay 
man in his early 20s known as “The Kid,” said that he had 
sold candies from a cart in Mezuak until 2000. He did not 
care much for religion until he was hooked up with The 
Afghan. By 2002, The Afghan and The Kid were in Madrid, 
the former as a part-time construction worker who dealt 
drugs with the Chinaman’s “bodyguards,” and the latter 
devoting himself to charity work helping out other young 
immigrants. 
In the fall of 2003, just after the Chinaman returned from a 
prison stint in Morocco, he and his chums from the “old 
neighborhood” of Mezuak linked up with the economics-
turned-religious student Serhane Fakhet and his buddies at a
couple of apartment-mosques and soccer fields, and in daily 
dealings along Tribulete Street (at the halal butcher shop, 
the Alhambra restaurant, the barbershop, and the cell phone 
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and Internet store) in the Lavapies neighborhood of central 
Madrid. The hands-on drug dealer and dreamy student 
bonded in an explosive combination. There was no al-
Qaeda, or any other outside organization, involved. 
From March to December 2007, I went to the Mezuak, and
found that at least a dozen other young men had “gone 
Afghan” since the summer of 2006, according to local 
residents who knew them. Each would one day suddenly 
shave his beard, don western clothes and simply disappear;
sometimes two vanished on the same day. Their friends and 
local Moroccan police say that they probably left for Iraq to 
become martyrs. The names and itineraries of 5 of them 
have been confirmed: Abdelmonim al-Amrani, Younes 
Achebak, Hamza Aklifa, and the brothers Bilal and Muncef 
Ben Aboud (DNA analysis has confirmed the suicide 
bombing death of Amrani in Baqubah, Iraq). All 5 attended 
a local elementary school (Abdelkrim Khattabi), the same 
one that Madrid’s Moroccan bombers attended. And 4 of
the 5 were in the same high school class (Kadi Ayadi, just 
outside Mezuak). The fifth, Bilal’s brother Muncef, was a 
gifted mathematics student who went on to receive a 
scholarship to Morocco’s prestigious air force academy, the 
École Royale de l’Air. But Muncef’s mother said he was 
unsettled by what was happening around the world to 
Muslims and left his studies as he sought solace in religion. 
All were soccer buddies who prayed at Masjad al-Rohban
(the Dawa Tabligh mosque where Kounjaa had first gone 
“Afghan”) and all hung out at the Chicago Café on 
Mamoun Street, Mezuak’s main drag. The cousin of one of
the Iraq-bound group (Hamza) was married to The Afghan, 
and all prayed in the same mosque where The Afghan first 
preached Jihad (the mosque’s Imam was arrested in 2006 
for collecting zaqat charity money from local business men 
to help send young men to Iraq). Friends say the young men 
bound for Iraq all respected the courage of the Madrid 
plotters but disagreed about their civilian targets and 
believed that action in Iraq would be more just and 
“soldierly” than in Europe. Like the Madrid plotters (as well 
as the Hamburg and London plotters), they were buddies,
hung out together at local cafés and restaurants, and 
mingled in the same barbershops (where young men gather 
and talk). 
The boundaries of the newer-wave networks are very loose, 
and the Internet now allows anyone who wishes to become 
a terrorist to become one anywhere, anytime. For example, 
the “Al-Ansar” chat room network was involved in plots by 
young men in half-a-dozen countries (U.S., U.K., Canada, 
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Sweden, Denmark, Bosnia), and many of the men had never 
physically met. They would hack into Midwest media sites 
to post jihadi videos (e.g., of Zarqawi’s beheading of Nick 
Berg) and recipes for making car bombs and suicide vests
from scratch. From a basement apartment in Britain, a self-
styled Irhabi 007 (“Terrorist 007”) helped in his spare time 
to coordinate plots with some high school chums in Toronto 
to blow up the Canadian parliament, and with others to 
attack the U.S. embassy in Bosnia (3 conspirators who did 
meet up physically in Bosnia were arrested with AK-47s, 
suicide belts, and thousands of rounds of ammunition). 
A main problem in terrorism studies is that most “experts” 
have little field experience (for understandable but not
insurmountable reasons) and otherwise lack the required 
level of details that statistical and trend analyses could 
properly mine. There are many millions of people who 
express sympathy with al-Qaeda or other forms of violent 
political expression that support terrorism. From a 2005-
2006 survey of 10 countries involving 50,000 interviews, a 
Gallup study projected that 7 percent of the world’s 1.3 
billion Muslims (some 90 million people) felt that the 
attacks on Sept. 11 were “completely justified.” There are, 
however, only a few thousands who show willingness to 
actually commit violence. They almost invariably go on to 
violence in small groups consisting mostly of friends and 
some kin (although friends tend to become kin as they 
marry one another's sisters and cousins; indeed, there are 
dozens of such marriages among members of Southeast 
Asia’s Jemaah Islamiyah).  
Conclusions from the Field 
The causes that humans are most willing to kill and die for 
are not just about particular ideas; they are about particular
groups of people, in particular places, at particular times. 
Terrorist groups that kill and die for the Takfiri cause arise 
within specific “scenes”: neighborhoods, schools (classes, 
dorms), workplaces, common leisure activities (soccer, 
mosque, barbershop café) and, increasingly, online chat 
rooms. The process of self-selection into terrorism occurs
within these scenes. Takfiri terrorism is stimulated by a 
massive, media-driven transnational political awakening in 
which Jihad is represented as the only the way to 
permanently resolve glaring problems of global injustice. 
This incites moral outrage against perceived attacks upon 
Islam. If moral outrage resonates with personal experience 
that reverberates among friends in a scene, and if aspects of 
the scene are already sufficiently action-oriented, such as 
group of soccer buddies or camp mates, then willingness to 
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go out and do violence together is much more likely.  
The publicity associated with spectacular acts of violence in 
the name of justice is the oxygen that currently fires
terrorism. As Saudi Arabia’s General Khaled Alhumaidan 
crisply said to me recently in Riyadh, “The front is in our 
neighborhoods but the battle is the silver screen. If it doesn’t 
make it to the six o’clock news, then al-Qaeda is not 
interested.” These young people constantly see and discuss 
among themselves images of war and injustice against “our 
people,” become morally outraged (especially if injustice
resonates personally, more a problem with immigrants in 
Europe than the USA), and dream a war for justice that 
gives their friendship cause. They mostly self-radicalize in 
cafés, barbershops, restaurants, and informal discussion 
groups (people mostly pray in mosques, not plot in them).  
Most human violence is committed by young people seeking 
adventure, dreams of glory, and esteem in the eyes of their 
peers. Omar Nasiri’s Inside Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda
(Perseus Books, 2006) rings true in its picture of the highs 
the militants get from the sense of brotherhood and sense of 
purpose. They want to belong to something that is at once 
intimate, bigger, and more permanent than a person alone. 
They kill and die for faith and friendship, which is the
foundation of all social and political union, that is, all 
enduring human associations of non-kin: shared faith reigns 
in self-interest and makes social life possible; friendship 
allows genetically unrelated individuals to cooperate to 
compete. The most heroic cause in the world today is Jihad, 
where anyone from anywhere can hope to make a mark 
against the most powerful army in the history of the world. 
But they need their friends to give them courage, and it is as 
much or more for love of comrades than the cause that they 
will kill and die for in the end. 
This new wave of Takfirism is about youth culture, not 
theology or ideology. It is mostly irrelevant to classic 
military and law enforcement programs that seek success by 
“imposing unsustainable costs” on enemies and criminals, as 
the U.S. Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense 
Review suggests. It is about sharing dreams, heroes, and 
hopes that are more enticing and empowering than any 
moral lessons or material offerings (although jobs that 
relieve the terrible boredom and inactivity of immigrant 
youth in Europe, and with underemployed throughout much 
of the Muslim world, can help offset the alluring stimulation 
of playing at war).  
How you change youth culture is a difficult and fickle affair. 
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Role models or small changes often have big effects on 
attitudes and fashions (gangster culture, skateboarding, 
post-Madonna belly-button exposure, Hush Puppies fad). 
Take the new comic book series of 99 Muslim superheroes, 
modeled on Marvel comics, which is rapidly catching the 
imagination of legions of Muslim youth in Southeast Asia 
and now the Middle East. The first issue of The Ninety-Nine 
(published in Arabic and English editions beginning in 
2006) weaves together heroic slam-bang action in the “fight 
for peace” with clear messages “to provide services ranging 
from the distribution of food and medicine to impoverished 
parts of the world” and “to multicultural educational 
programs and housing initiatives.”  
It is also important to provide alternate local networks and 
chat rooms that speak to the inherent idealism, sense of risk 
and adventure, and need for peer approval that young 
people everywhere tend toward. It even could be a 21st-
century version of what the Boy Scouts and high school 
football teams did for immigrants and potentially 
troublesome youth as America urbanized a century ago. 
Ask any cop on the beat: these things work. It has to be 
done with the input and insight of local communities, 
however, or it will not work. De-radicalization, like 
radicalization itself, engages from the bottom up, not from 
the top down. This, of course, is not how you stop terrorism 
today, but how you help prevent it tomorrow. 
Scott Atran is Presidential Scholar at the John Jay College 
of Criminal Justice in New York City, Visiting Professor of 
Psychology and Public Policy at the University of 
Michigan, and Research Director in Anthropology at the 
National Center for Scientific Research in Paris.
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